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INTRODUCTION 
There is arguably no penalty severe enough to punish those who 
sexually abuse and murder children.1 However, the federal and Flor-
ida Constitutions say otherwise. 
This Article takes the difficult position of exploring whether the 
State of Florida has deprived sexually violent predators—actors who 
unequivocally embody evil—of their constitutional rights.   This Ar-
ticle examines and calls attention to the question of whether the 
United States justice system’s treatment of these sexually violent 
predators has the unintended consequence of undermining and erod-
ing due process and liberty. 
Florida civilly commits these criminals to indefinite confine-
ment after the completion of their criminal sentences.2 Under this 
regime, the court or a jury decides whether to release the criminal 
back into society after the criminal completes his or her sentence.  
In making this decision, the fact finder considers whether the crim-
inal might—in the future— commit another act of sexual violence 
against a child, and if so, to indefinitely commit the criminal to de-
tention at a mental institution.3 
Let it be clear: Crimes of sexual violence are unspeakably evil 
and the perpetrators of these crimes should be punished to the max-
imum extent permitted by law.4 This Article should not be miscon-
strued as a plea for leniency with respect to punishing sexually vio-
lent predators.  Rather, the Article strives to identify the boundaries 
of legally permissible punishments, as well as provide ideas and in-
formation intended to improve our system of justice by, for example, 
                                                                                                             
 1 See Steven J. Wernick, In Accordance with a Public Outcry: Zoning Out 
Sex Offenders Through Residence Restrictions in Florida, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1147, 
1151 (2006). 
 2 See infra Part I, Section B. 
 3 See 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (titled “Civil commitment of a sexually dangerous 
person”). 
 4 See Wernick, supra note 1, at 1151. 
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issuing stiffer criminal sentences that satisfy constitutional safe-
guards. 
The impetus for confining these criminals is readily apparent.  
The examples of horrifying cases are plenty. Megan Kanka was 
seven years old when she was raped and murdered by a man with 
two previous convictions for sexually assaulting children.5 Megan’s 
grave is covered in pink flowers—her favorite color.6 Eleven-year-
old Jacob Wetterling was riding his bike home in 1989 after renting 
a movie when he was kidnapped, assaulted, and murdered by Danny 
Heinrich.7 Jacob’s body was not found until 2016, after Heinrich 
confessed, he admitted that Jacob asked him “What did I do wrong?” 
before Heinrich shot Jacob.8 Jimmy Ryce, nine years old, was walk-
ing home from the school bus in South Florida when he was ab-
ducted by Juan Carlos Chavez.9 Chavez raped Jimmy, shot him in 
the back, and dismembered Jimmy before hiding his body in plant-
ers.10 Jessica Lunsford was also a nine-year-old from Florida when 
                                                                                                             
 5 See Rich Schapiro, Parents of Little Girl Who Inspired Megan’s Law Re-
call Tragedy, NY DAILY NEWS (July 27, 2014, 2:30 AM), http://www.nydailyn-
ews.com/news/crime/parents-girl-inspired-megan-law-recall-tragedy-article-
1.1881551. 
 6 See id.; The Associated Press, Excerpt and Statement in ‘Megan’ Murder 
Case, NEW YORK TIMES (June 19, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com
/1997/06/19/nyregion/excerpt-and-statement-in-megan-murder-case.html. 
 7 See James Wetterling’s Killer: “I am truly sorry for my evil acts”, CBS 
News (Nov. 21, 2016, 2:14 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/jacob-wetter-
lings-killer-danny-heinrich-i-am-truly-sorry-for-my-evil-acts/ [hereinafter James 
Wetterling’s Killer]; ‘The Hunt’: Jacob Wetterling’s Abductor, CNN (Aug. 31, 
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/03/us/jacob-wetterling-abductor-the-hunt-
johwn-walsh/. 
 8 See James Wetterling’s Killer, supra note 7. 
 9 See Jay Weaver & David Ovalle, Juan Carlos Chavez Executed for Murder 
of Jimmy Ryce (Feb. 12, 2014, 11:34 AM), http://www.miamiher-
ald.com/news/state/article1960281.html. 
 10 See id. 
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she was abducted and raped by John Couey, a convicted sex of-
fender living near her home.11 Couey buried Jessica alive in a gar-
bage bag.12 
When confronted with the most frightening, sickening acts that 
human beings inflict on others, a primary comfort to the victims’ 
families involves assuring that the perpetrator will never harm an-
other child. Indeed, Megan, Jacob, Jimmy, and Jessica are all name-
sakes for acts of state legislation aimed at preventing similar future 
crimes.13 These laws, referred to as Sexually Violent Predator 
(“SVP”) statutes, typically have registration or notification require-
ments and impose residency restrictions.  Most significantly, with 
regard to infringing on the right to due process, SVP statutes permit 
indefinite civil commitment after the completion of a criminal sen-
tence. 
In response to the cruel torture Jimmy Ryce endured, Florida’s 
legislature enacted the Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Commitment for 
Sexually Violent Predators Treatment and Care Act (“Jimmy Ryce 
Act”) in 1998.14 The Act was part of “a national movement to ‘get 
tough’ on sex offenders after the heinous murder and rape” of 
Jimmy.15 But the Jimmy Ryce Act was not the first “unique pen-
                                                                                                             
 11 See Convicted Child Killer Couey Dies in Prison, Florida Officials Say, 
CNN (Sep. 30, 2009, 7:42 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/09/30/florida.couey.dead/; The Associated 
Press, Convicted Child Killer John Evander Couey Dies in Prison, Before 
Planned Execution, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Oct. 1, 2009, 9:23 AM) 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/convicted-child-killer-john-evander
-couey-dies-prison-planned-execution-article-1.382004. 
 12 See id. 
 13 See Schapiro, supra note 5; Weaver & Ovalle, supra note 9; Convicted 
Child Killer Couey Dies in Prison, Florida Officials Say, supra note 11; Jacob 
Wetterling’s Killer, supra note 7. 
 14 John Matthew Fabian, The Risky Business of Conducting Risk Assessments 
for Those Already Civilly Committed as Sexually Violent Predators, 32 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 81, 82–83 (2005) (quoting Mari M. Presley, Comment, Jimmy 
Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators’ Treatment 
and Care Act: Replacing Criminal Justice with Civil Commitment, 26 FLA. ST. 
U.L. REV. 487, 494 (1999)); Presley, supra note 14, at 488. 
 15 Fabian, supra note 14, at 83; Presley, supra note 14, at 494. 
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alt[y] that state and federal justice systems appl[ied] to sex offend-
ers.”16 The state of Washington “passed the first modern SVP statute 
in 1990.”17 
SVP statutes often impose civil commitment on SVPs that meet 
certain criteria.  The Jimmy Ryce Act, for example, requires a prior 
conviction for sexual violence, a mental abnormality, and a likeli-
hood of reoffending.18 
Critics of SVP civil commitment laws question whether these 
commitment statutes are “in truth, only further punishment of des-
pised criminals.”19 They argue that these acts are “thinly veiled ef-
fort[s] to circumvent a disappointing criminal justice system by 
keeping these criminals locked up long past their expired jail sen-
tences.”20 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld SVP 
statutes as constitutional because the statutes are civil and not puni-
tive.21 But, “[c]ivil commitment [remains] the single most intrusive 
paradigm of post-conviction restraint, and it deserves our continued 
attention. . . .”22 In fact, Jacob Wetterling’s mother, Patty, an advo-
cate of children’s safety and a former chair of the Board of Directors 
of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children,23 has 
become an outspoken critic of sex offender registry laws, including 
the Adam Walsh Act24 (the federal embodiment of the Jimmy Ryce 
Act).  Patty Wetterling has urged “a second look” to determine 
                                                                                                             
 16 John L. Schwab, Due Process and “The Worst of the Worst”: Mental Com-
petence in Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment Proceedings, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 912, 913 (2012). 
 17 Id. at 916. 
 18 See Presley, supra note 14, at 488. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See Mary Prescott, Invasion of the Body Snatchers: Civil Commitment Af-
ter Adam Walsh, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 839, 839–40 (2010). 
 22 Id. at 839. 
 23 See Board of Directors, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD., 
http://www.missingkids.org/boardofdirectors (last visited Apr. 17, 2017) (listing 
prior Board of Directors for the National Center for Missing and Exploited Chil-
dren). 
 24 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (“Adam Walsh Act”) of 
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16991 (2012). 
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“whether laws like the ones named for her son are doing more harm 
than good and should be curbed.”25 
This Article seeks to address the “single most invasive paradigm 
of post-conviction restraint,”26 and grapples with the competing in-
terests of the general public. When reviewing these statutes, the par-
amount safety of our children and deterrence to de-incentivize atro-
cious violence must be balanced against fundamental constitutional 
concepts of due process and the limits of the power of the police 
state. Florida Supreme Court Justice Barbara J. Pariente recognized 
the tension inherent in SVP civil commitment statutes in her dissent-
ing opinion in Westerheide v. State: 
Let there be no mistake: I deplore the criminal acts 
that [the defendant] committed. However, no matter 
how reprehensible an individual’s past criminal be-
havior has been, this country has prided itself on 
placing constitutional restrictions on the government 
before that individual’s liberty may be completely re-
strained.27 
Part II of this Article describes SVP statutes, including a brief 
history, and provides more detail regarding the requirements of the 
Jimmy Ryce Act.28 Part III examines prior constitutional challenges 
in the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of chal-
lenges to the Jimmy Ryce Act—Florida being the only state in the 
Eleventh Circuit with an SVP civil commitment statute.29 Part IV 
discusses the challenges to the constitutional justification that the 
Jimmy Ryce Act is “civil” rather than “punitive,”30 Part V concludes 
                                                                                                             
 25 See Matt Mellema, Chanakya Sethi, & Jane Shim, Sex Offender Laws Have 
Gone Too Far, SLATE (Aug. 11, 2014, 12:20 PM), http://www.slate.com/arti-
cles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/08/sex_offender_registry_laws_have
_our_policies_gone_too_far.html. See also Sarah Stillman, The List, THE NEW 
YORKER (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/
when-kids-are-accused-of-sex-crimes (reviewing unintended consequences of 
sex offender registries and the Adam Walsh Act). 
 26 Prescott, supra note 21, at 839. 
 27 Westerheide v. State of Florida, 831 So. 2d 93, 120 (Fla. 2002) (Pariente, 
J., dissenting in part). 
 28 See infra Part I. 
 29 See infra Part II. 
 30 See infra Part III. 
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that criminal justice reform may be a better means to both protect 
victims from sexual predators and prevent circumvention of consti-
tutional protections for individual liberties.31 
I.  SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR CIVIL COMMITMENT ACTS 
“Sex crimes have long been considered among the most mon-
strous offenses in society, especially when the victims are chil-
dren.”32 Legislation responding to sex crimes, particularly those 
against children, “has progressed from laws focused on identifying 
sex offenders and notifying the public, to laws that literally remove 
certain offenders from a community altogether.”33 The most strin-
gent laws, classified as civil commitment laws, “serve[] multiple 
purposes, only one of which is incapacitation.”34 This Section be-
gins with a brief historical overview of criminal punishment and 
civil restraints placed on sexually violent predators.35 It then pro-
vides a description of the implementation and logistics of Florida’s 
Jimmy Ryce Act.36 
A. A Historical Pendulum of Criminal Punishment and Civil 
Restraint of Sexually Violent Predators 
By 1960, a majority of states enacted sexual predator legislation, 
“though the laws were rarely implemented.”37 However, “[b]y the 
end of the 1980s, the number of states with sexual predator legisla-
tion had been cut in half due to concerns about the violation of con-
stitutional rights and about whether such treatment programs were 
successful in diminishing sex offending once the offender [was] re-
leased.”38 
As access to media progressed and news coverage of heartbreak-
ing stories like Megan, Jacob, and Jimmy’s increased, the pendulum 
soon swung in the opposite direction.39 By 1996, all fifty states and 
                                                                                                             
 31 See infra Conclusion. 
 32 Wernick, supra note 1, at 1151. 
 33 Id. at 1153. 
 34 Presley, supra note 14, at 502. 
 35 See infra Part I, Section A. 
 36 See infra Part I, Section B. 
 37 Fabian, supra note 14, at 89. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See Wernick, supra note 1, at 1153. 
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the District of Columbia had a law requiring registration and notifi-
cation protocols ensuring public access to information about regis-
tered sex offenders.40 Residence restrictions soon followed.41 In 
1996, shortly after Jimmy Ryce’s death, “Florida became the first 
state to enact statewide residence restrictions against sexual preda-
tors whose victims were children.”42 In 1999, Alabama, also an 
Eleventh Circuit state, became the first state to extend the re-
strictions to all sex offenders.43 
Since then, twenty states—Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, 
Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin, as 
well as the District of Columbia, have enacted laws permitting the 
civil commitment of sexual offenders.44 In 2006, Congress enacted 
the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act,45 which author-
ized the federal government to make grants to states in order to es-
tablish civil commitment programs for sexually dangerous per-
sons.46 
The statutes’ impact on reducing sexually violent crimes is 
murky.47 Although a “decrease in sexual offending and reoffending 
has indeed occurred in Florida and nationwide,” “[w]hatever effect 
civil commitment has had on preventing sexual crime, it is much 
smaller than lawmakers likely expected.”48 
Admittedly, if the threat of indefinite civil commitment does not 
stop sexually violent predators from committing sex crimes against 
                                                                                                             
 40 See id. at 1154. 
 41 See id. at 1153–54. See, e.g., id. at 1157. 
 42 Id. at 1157. 
 43 See id. 
 44 See id. at 1157–58 n.60. Schwab, supra note 16, at 917 n.31 (citing Adam 
Deming, Sex Offender Civil Commitment Programs: Current Practices, Charac-
teristics, and Resident Demographics, 36 J. Psychiatry & L. 439, 441 (2008)). 
 45 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16991. 
 46 See 42 U.S.C. § 16971 (“[T]he Attorney General shall make grants to ju-
risdictions for the purpose of establishing, enhancing, or operating effective civil 
commitment programs for sexually dangerous persons.”). 
 47 See generally, e.g., Daniel Montaldi, A Study of the Efficacy of the Sexually 
Violent Predator Act in Florida, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 780 (2015). 
 48 Id. at 848 (“In fact, the effect is too small to have had any empirically 
measurable effect on statewide sex crimes or totals.”). 
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children then this statistic offers a practical basis for removing these 
offenders from our communities. 
B. Florida’s Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent 
Predators Act, (the Jimmy Ryce Act) 
Over three years after Jimmy Ryce’s backpack was found in 
Chavez’s trailer, the Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Vi-
olent Predators Act (the “Jimmy Ryce Act” or “the Act”) went into 
effect in Florida.49 As discussed in Part IV, the Act was originally 
enacted in Title XLVII Criminal Procedure & Corrections, Chapter 
916 Mentally Deficient and Mentally Ill Defendants.50 Now, how-
ever, the Act is part of a civil body of law, Title XXIX Public Health 
and Chapter 394 Mental Health.51 
Florida’s statutory definition of a “sexually violent predator” is 
“any person who: (a) [h]as been convicted of a sexually violent of-
fense; and (b) [s]uffers from a mental abnormality or personality 
disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual vi-
olence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, 
and treatment.”52 The two factors actually create three criteria: (1) a 
previous conviction for sexual violence; (2) a mental abnormality; 
and (3) likely to reoffend.53 
The Department of Children and Families is the state agency 
“responsible for establishing and maintaining the [State and Violent 
Predators Program (“SVPP”)].”54 The SVPP is located in Tallahas-
see and is “responsible for making commitment-related recommen-
dations to state attorneys and for overseeing the operation of the 
Florida Civil Commitment Center (FCCC). . . .”55 All case refer-
rals—typically from the Department of Corrections—are received 
and processed by the SVPP for commitment consideration.56 
                                                                                                             
 49 See id. at 786. 
 50 See infra Part III. 
 51 See FLA. STAT. §§ 394.910–394.932 (2016). 
 52 Id. 
 53 See id. 
 54 Montaldi, supra note 47, at 786. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See id. 
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II.  PRIOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
Civil commitment regimes are typically justified under either the 
State’s parens patriae power or its police power.57 Put simply, the 
state’s parens patriae power obligates the state “to provide and care 
for individuals who, due to a mental condition, cannot provide for 
themselves.”58 The police power doctrine obligates the state to, in 
pertinent part, “protect its citizens from dangerous, mentally ill per-
sons.”59 
Whatever the justification for the state’s power to enact such a 
law, the Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the “Leg-
islature has the final word on declarations on public policy, and the 
courts are bound to give great weight to legislative determinations 
of facts.”60 For similar reasons, the United States Supreme Court has 
repeatedly upheld SVP civil commitment statutes as constitu-
tional.61 This Section briefly explores two determinations from the 
United States Supreme Court. It then examines the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s review and handling of challenges to the Jimmy Ryce Act, the 
only state SVP statute in the Eleventh Circuit. 
A. The Supreme Court Held That SVP Statutes do not Violate 
Constitutional Safeguards; and that the Federal Statute is 
Valid Under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
The Supreme Court first encountered a challenge to an SVP stat-
ute similar to the Jimmy Ryce Act in Kansas v. Hendricks.62 Leroy 
Hendricks had an extensive history of sexually molesting children.63 
When he was due to be released from prison, the State of Kansas 
filed a petition under the State’s Sexually Violent Predator Act (the 
                                                                                                             
 57 See Presley, supra note 14, at 502–503. 
 58 Id. at 503. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Westerheide, 831 So. 2d at 101 (quoting Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 
So. 2d 189, 196 (Fla. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also id. (quot-
ing Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 196) (“[L]egislative determinations of public purpose 
and facts are presumed correct and entitled to deference, unless clearly errone-
ous.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61 See infra Part II, Section A. 
 62 See 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997). 
 63 See id. 
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“Kansas Act”) in state court to involuntarily commit Hendricks.64 
Hendricks was the first individual to be civilly committed under the 
state civil commitment law.65 
Hendricks appealed his commitment and the Kansas Supreme 
Court ruled that the Kansas Act was invalid because the term “men-
tal abnormality” did not satisfy the substantive due process require-
ment that involuntary civil commitment must be based on the find-
ing of the presence of a “mental illness.”66 The Kansas Supreme 
Court did not address Hendricks’s claims that the Kansas Act vio-
lated his constitutional right protected by the ex post facto and dou-
ble jeopardy clauses.67 
The State of Kansas petitioned for certiorari with the United 
States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court ultimately found that 
the Kansas Act’s definition of “mental abnormality” satisfied sub-
stantive due process requirements.68 The Court began by noting that 
“[a]lthough freedom from physical restraint has always been at the 
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbi-
trary governmental action, that liberty interest is not absolute.”69 
Even in the civil context, “an individual’s constitutionally protected 
interest in avoiding physical restraint may be overridden. . . .”70 
Overriding factors include what is necessary for “the common 
good,” and whether without “manifold restraints” that ensure the 
common good, “organized society could not exist with safety to its 
members.”71 So long as “the confinement takes place pursuant to 
proper procedures and evidentiary standards,” the Court has consist-
ently upheld state statutes that provide “for the forcible civil detain-
ment of people who are unable to control their behavior” and are 
thus “a danger to the public health and safety.”72 
                                                                                                             
 64 See id. 
 65 See id. 
 66 See id. 
 67 See id. at 356 (“The majority [of the Kansas Supreme Court] did not ad-
dress Hendricks’ ex post facto or double jeopardy claims.”). 
 68 See id. at 350, 356. 
 69 Id. at 356 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 70 Id. 
 71 See id. at 357 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72 See id. 
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The Kansas Act required not only a finding of dangerousness, 
but also proof of an additional factor: a mental abnormality.73 Hen-
dricks argued that the “mental abnormality” term was not the equiv-
alent of “mental illness”; “mental abnormality” was a legal term, not 
a medical term.74 The Court found that the Kansas Act did not vio-
late Hendricks’s constitutional due process right, however, because: 
(1) Even in psychiatry, the definitions of “mental illness” are varia-
ble; and (2) Hendricks was diagnosed with pedophilia and had tes-
tified that he was unable to control himself.75 
Next, the Court considered whether the Kansas Act established 
criminal proceedings, which would implicate Hendricks’s constitu-
tional protections against double jeopardy and ex post facto prose-
cution.76 Hendricks argued that the Kansas Act establishes criminal 
proceedings because the newly enacted punishment is predicated on 
past conduct for which he has already been convicted and forced to 
serve a prison sentence.77 The Court disagreed and found that the 
civil commitment proceedings did not amount to criminal proceed-
ings for five main reasons.78 
First, “[t]he categorization of a particular proceeding as civil or 
criminal ‘is first of all a question of statutory construction.’”79 Kan-
sas’s legislature intended to create a civil proceeding and that intent 
is evidenced by the placement of the Kansas Act in the probate code 
rather than the criminal code, as well as the description of the Kan-
sas Act as a civil commitment procedure.80 Justice Thomas, writing 
for the Court, noted that “[n]othing on the face of the [Kansas Act] 
suggests that the legislature sought to create anything other than 
civil commitment scheme designed to protect the public from 
harm.”81 The Court only rejected the legislature’s manifest intent 
when a party “challenging the statute provides ‘the clearest proof’ 
                                                                                                             
 73 See id. at 357–58. 
 74 See id. at 358–59. 
 75 See id. at 359–60. 
 76 See id. at 360–61. 
 77 See id. at 360. 
 78 See id. at 360–69. 
 79 Id. at 361. 
 80 See id. 
 81 Id. 
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that ‘the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect 
as to the negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil’. . . .”82 
Second, the Court found that commitment under the Kansas Act 
did “not implicate either of the two primary objectives of criminal 
punishment: retribution or deterrence.”83 The Act was “not retribu-
tive because it does not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct. 
Instead such conduct is used solely for evidentiary purposes, either 
to demonstrate that a ‘mental abnormality’ exists or to support a 
finding of future dangerousness.”84 
Third, the Court reasoned that, unlike a criminal statute, the 
Kansas Act did not require a finding of scienter to commit an indi-
vidual as a sexually violent predator.85 The commitment was based 
on a mental abnormality rather than criminal intent.86 Thus, the 
Court concluded, confinement was not intended to be retributive.87 
Fourth, the Kansas Act did not function as a deterrent in the way 
that a criminal punishment does because people suffering from a 
mental abnormality are “unlikely to be deterred by the threat of con-
finement” considering they are unable to exercise adequate control 
over their behavior.88 
Last, the Court reasoned the Kansas Act to be civil, not punitive, 
because individuals confined under the Kansas Act were not subject 
to punitive conditions.89 Even though the Kansas Act included “an 
affirmative restraint, ‘the mere fact that a person is detained does 
not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has im-
posed punishment.’”90 The Kansas legislature took “great care to 
confine only a narrow class of particularly dangerous individuals, 
and then only after meeting the strictest procedural standards.”91 The 
determination “that the [Kansas Act] is nonpunitive thus removes an 
                                                                                                             
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 361–62. 
 84 Id. at 362. 
 85 See id. at 362. 
 86 See id. 
 87 See id. 
 88 Id. at 362–63. 
 89 See id. at 363. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 364. 
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essential prerequisite for both Hendricks’ double jeopardy and ex 
post facto claims.”92 
Justice Kennedy, whose concurrence in the judgment was par-
ticularly key as it provided the fifth vote,93 wrote to “caution against 
dangers inherent when a civil confinement law is used in conjunc-
tion with the criminal process, whether or not the law is given retro-
active application.”94 Justice Kennedy recognized that for the des-
picable nature of crimes like Hendricks’s, “a life term may well have 
been the only sentence appropriate to protect society and vindicate 
the wrong,” but highlighted the concern that “[w]e should bear in 
mind that while incapacitation is a goal common to both the criminal 
and civil systems of confinement, retribution and general deterrence 
are reserved for the criminal system alone.”95 The Kansas Act, there-
fore, risks the State using the civil system to impose a sentence it 
either was not able to initially procure through the criminal judicial 
system or was the result of an “improvident plea bargain on the 
criminal side.”96 
Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg dissented, with 
Justice Breyer writing the dissenting opinion.97 Justice Breyer 
pointed out “[c]ertain resemblances between the [Kansas] Act’s 
‘civil commitment’ and traditional criminal punishments are obvi-
ous,” noting that the “secure confinement” amounted to “incarcera-
tion against one’s will.”98 
More than ten years later the Supreme Court was confronted 
with the federal version of the Kansas Act and the Jimmy Ryce Act 
in United States v. Comstock.99 In Comstock, the Court examined 
“whether the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, grants 
Congress authority sufficient to enact the. . . [civil commitment 
scheme of the Adam Walsh Act].”100 Ultimately, the Court also con-
                                                                                                             
 92 Id. at 369. 
 93 See Pesci v. Budz, 730 F.3d 1291, 1297 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 94 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371–72 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 95 Id. at 373. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See id. at 373–98. 
 98 Id. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 99 560 U.S. 126 (2010). 
 100 Id. at 133. See also 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (titled “Civil commitment of a sex-
ually dangerous person”). 
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sidered five factors, which when “‘taken together’ led to the conclu-
sion that the Necessary and Proper clause granted Congress the 
power to enact the federal SVP statute.”101 The Court considered: 
(1) [T]he breadth of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, (2) the long history of federal involvement in 
this arena, (3) the sound reasons for the statute’s en-
actment in light of the Government’s custodial inter-
est in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by 
those in federal custody, (4) the statute’s accommo-
dation of state interests, and (5) the statute’s narrow 
scope.102 
As a starting point, the Court assumed, based on Kansas v. Hen-
dricks, that the Due Process Clause did “not prohibit civil commit-
ment in these circumstances.”103 Next, the Supreme Court reviewed 
the five factors in some detail, and ultimately reasoned that: 
Taken together, these considerations lead us to con-
clude that the statute is a “necessary and proper” 
means of exercising the federal authority that permits 
Congress to create federal criminal laws, to punish 
their violation, to imprison violators, to provide ap-
propriately for those imprisoned, and to maintain the 
security of those who are not imprisoned but who 
may be affected by the federal imprisonment of oth-
ers. The Constitution consequently authorizes Con-
gress to enact the statute.104 
But nothing in the Court’s reasoning supported civil commit-
ment for future crimes.105 Justice Kennedy again concurred, this 
time taking issue with the conclusions that the majority reached in 
order to find that the federal civil commitment statute was necessary 
                                                                                                             
 101 Schwab, supra note 16, at 921 (summarizing the Comstock considerations 
for whether a civil commitment statute violated a defendants’ due process rights). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Comstock, 560 U.S. at 133. 
 104 Id. at 149. 
 105 See generally Comstock, 560 U.S. 126. 
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and proper.106 Justice Kennedy argued that the majority’s opinion 
was based on case law which was inapplicable.107 
Justice Alito also concurred, noting that the only question the 
Court needed to review was whether “it is also necessary and proper 
for Congress to protect the public from dangers created by the fed-
eral criminal justice and prison systems.”108 Justice Alito took a sim-
plified approach, reasoning that “[j]ust as it is necessary and proper 
for Congress to provide for the apprehension of escaped federal pris-
oners, it is necessary and proper for Congress to provide for the civil 
commitment of dangerous federal prisoners who would otherwise 
escape civil commitment as a result of federal imprisonment.”109 
But the analogy ignores that the Adam Walsh Act allows for 
confinement of individuals that (1) have already served time for a 
crime or (2) have not yet committed a further crime.110 The escaped 
federal prisoner ostensibly (1) has not finished serving time for the 
original time, and (2) is in the process of committing another crime. 
Congress’s proper invocation of the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
detain escaped prisoners is an insufficient means of support for Con-
gress’s use of the Necessary and Proper Clause to detain individuals 
that served their sentences and have not committed further crimes. 
Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented, noting that: 
[F]ederal legislation is a valid exercise of Congress’ 
authority under the [Necessary and Proper] Clause if 
it satisfies a two-part test: First, the law must be di-
rected toward a “legitimate” end, which McCulloch 
[v. Maryland] defines as one “within the scope of the 
[C]onstitution”—that is, the powers expressly dele-
gated to the Federal Government by some provision 
in the Constitution. Second, there must be a neces-
sary and proper fit between the “means” (the federal 
                                                                                                             
 106 See id. at 150 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 107 See id. at 152 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 108 Id. at 157 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 109 Id. 
 110 See 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a). 
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law) and the “end” (the enumerated power or pow-
ers) it is designed to serve.111 
Justice Thomas concluded that “[n]o enumerated power in Arti-
cle I, § 8, expressly delegates to Congress the power to enact a civil-
commitment regime for sexually dangerous persons, nor does any 
other provision in the Constitution vest Congress or the other 
branches of the Federal Government with such a power.”112 Thus, 
the Adam Walsh Act “can be a valid exercise of congressional au-
thority only if it is ‘necessary and proper for carrying into Execu-
tion’ one or more of those federal powers actually enumerated in the 
Constitution.”113 The dissent eviscerated any connection to a federal 
power that Congress may have relied upon in order to enact the 
Adam Walsh Act.114 
In conclusion, the dissent stated that the power to protect the 
community is “among the numerous powers that remain with the 
States.”115 “States may take measures to restrict the freedom of the 
dangerously mentally ill. . . provided that such commitments satisfy 
due process and other constitutional requirements.”116 
The dissent recognized that “protecting society from violent sex-
ual offenders is certainly an important end” and that “[s]exual abuse 
is a despicable act with untold consequences for the victim person-
ally and society generally.”117 However, the dissent stated that “the 
Constitution does not vest in Congress the authority to protect soci-
ety from every bad act that might befall it.”118 Permitting the Con-
stitution to extend to such a degree, “comes perilously close to trans-
forming the Necessary and Proper Clause into a basis for the federal 
police power that we always have rejected.”119 
                                                                                                             
 111 Comstock, 560 U.S. at 160 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)). 
 112 Id. at 163. 
 113 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18). 
 114 See id. at 163. 
 115 Id. at 164. 
 116 Id. at 164 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 117 Id. at 165. 
 118 Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992)). 
 119 Id. at 180 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
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B. The Eleventh Circuit’s Treatment of the Jimmy Ryce Act. 
Florida is the only state in the Eleventh Circuit with an SVP stat-
ute, and there are only twelve published Eleventh Circuit opinions 
concerning the Jimmy Ryce Act, primarily in the context of habeas 
petitions and claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There is a 
dearth of Eleventh Circuit case law considering constitutional chal-
lenges to the Jimmy Ryce Act. 
The Eleventh Circuit has never addressed the constitutionality 
of the Jimmy Ryce Act. For example, in Newsome v. Broward 
County Public Defenders, Alonzo Newsome appealed the dismissal 
of his § 1983 complaint, challenging his civil commitment under the 
Jimmy Ryce Act as unconstitutional.120 Invoking the Younger v. 
Harris Abstention Doctrine,121 the Eleventh Circuit refused to con-
sider whether the Jimmy Ryce Act was unconstitutional, but noted 
that it was “equally clear that this case involves an important state 
interest, namely, Florida’s need to ensure that violent sex offenders 
do not harm its citizens after the expiration of their incarcerative 
sentences.”122 
Rather than review the constitutionality of the Jimmy Ryce Act, 
the Eleventh Circuit has instead analyzed discrete questions related 
to the Act.123 Notably, the Court analyzed these claims invoked by 
other inmates.124 For example, in Bauder v. Department of Correc-
tions, Bauder, a state prisoner, brought a federal habeas petition cit-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel, where his defense counsel 
failed to warn him that taking a plea might later subject him to civil 
commitment under the Jimmy Ryce Act.125 After procedural volley-
ing, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that a 
                                                                                                             
 120 See 304 F. App’x 814, 814–15 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 121 Id. at 816. Under the Younger Abstention Doctrine, “federal courts ordi-
narily must refrain from deciding the merits of a case when (1) there is a pending 
state judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; 
and (3) the parties have an adequate opportunity to raise any constitutional claims 
in the state proceeding.” See id. (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden 
State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 
U.S. 36 (1970). 
 122 Id. 
 123 See, e.g., Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 333 F. App’x 422 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 124 See id. at 423. 
 125 See id. at 423. 
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failure to advise about the risks of the Jimmy Ryce Act was ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel because “pending criminal charges may 
carry a risk of adverse [collateral] consequences.”126 
On the other hand, in Troville v. Venz, the Eleventh Circuit re-
fused to allow Troville, who had been civilly committed pursuant to 
the Jimmy Ryce Act, to bring an action under the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act.127 The Eleventh Circuit held that “[c]ivil detention is 
by definition non-punitive” and thus, a civil detainee “simply does 
not fall under § 1915’s definition of ‘prisoner . . . .’”128 
The Eleventh Circuit came close to reviewing the constitution-
ality of civil commitment in Pesci v. Budz.129 In Pesci, the Eleventh 
Circuit reviewed a civil detainee’s claim that a detention center pol-
icy forbidding a certain publication infringed on his First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights.130 The district court previously reviewed 
Pesci’s claims under Turner v. Safley, which held that “when a 
prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the reg-
ulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests.”131 
Pesci argued that “since he [was] not a prison inmate—rather 
only a civil detainee—Turner [did] not provide sufficient protection 
of his First Amendment rights” and asked the Eleventh Circuit to 
use a standard of intermediate scrutiny from United States v. 
O’Brien.132 The court noted that there was “no salient difference be-
tween a civil detention center like the FCCC and a prison”133 but 
determined that a “balance should be struck in scrutinizing the con-
stitutional claims of civil detainees” and “the standard must be mod-
ified to reflect the salient differences between civil detention and 
                                                                                                             
 126 See 619 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 
356, 369 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 127 See 303 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 128 Id. 
 129 730 F.3d 1291. 
 130 See id. at 1292. 
 131 Pesci, 730 F.3d at 1296 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 132 Id. at 1296. See also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 133 Pesci, 730 F.3d at 1299. 
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criminal incarceration.”134 The Court noted “that the range of legit-
imate governmental interests is narrower [in the civil commitment 
context] than it is in the prison context.”135 
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the “‘legitimate peno-
logical interests’ highlighted by the Supreme Court in Turner are 
not coextensive with the legitimate interests found in the civil de-
tention context” because civil commitment is not penological.136 
Accordingly, “the government’s interests in retribution and general 
deterrence—plainly legitimate justifications for prison regula-
tions—decidedly are not a proper foundation for the restriction of 
civil detainees’ constitutional rights.”137 
Moreover, the government “may not justify a restraint on detain-
ees’ constitutional rights for reasons related to punitive conditions 
of confinement.”138 But, where a civil regulation has a “valid, ra-
tional connection to legitimate interests in institutional order, safety, 
and security and in the rehabilitation and treatment of civil detain-
ees” regulations on civil detainees are appropriate.139  Ultimately, 
the Eleventh Circuit determined that “while there may be shared 
governmental interests surrounding civil and criminal detention, 
they are not coextensive. Thus, in the context of this case, the gov-
ernment may not justify a limitation on expressive freedoms based 
on retribution or general deterrence.”140 
III.  IS THE JIMMY RYCE ACT PUNITIVE RATHER THAN CIVIL? 
If sexual predator commitment statutes “only further punish-
ment of despised criminals,” and are “thinly veiled effort[s] to cir-
cumvent a disappointing criminal justice system by keeping these 
criminals locked up long past their expired jail sentences,”141 the 
Eleventh Circuit should review the Jimmy Ryce Act using the crite-
ria in Kansas v. Hendricks.142 This Section begins by examining the 
                                                                                                             
 134 Id. at 1297. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 1298. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Presley, supra note 14, at 488. 
 142 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360–69. 
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factors that indicate that the Jimmy Ryce Act is punitive rather than 
civil. It then examines the use of the term “mental abnormality” in 
the statute and the possible resulting overreach. Finally, this Section 
reviews other varied challenges to SVP statutes, including a failure 
to hold an adversarial probable cause hearing. 
A. Statutory Signs that the Legislature Intended the Jimmy 
Ryce Act to Impose Punitive Consequences 
One of the determining factors the Supreme Court relied on in 
its designation of the Kansas SVP law as civil rather than criminal 
in Kansas v. Hendricks was statutory construction.143 In Hendricks, 
the Court noted that the SVP was part of the Kansas probate code, 
instead of the criminal code.144 Although now part of the Public 
Health laws,145 the Jimmy Ryce Act was originally enacted in Title 
XLVII Criminal Procedure & Corrections, Chapter 916 Mentally 
Deficient and Mentally Ill Defendants. Thus, under Hendricks, the 
original placement of the Act evidences an intent to extend the sen-
tences of the original crimes.146 
Another indication that the Jimmy Ryce Act is punitive in nature 
is the lack of provisions for treatment or monitoring of an offender 
following release from commitment.147 Kansas and Washington of-
ficials warned legislators of the need to include provisions for treat-
ment in order for the confinement to serve a purpose other than ret-
ribution or deterrence.148 The lack of any meaningful provision of 
treatment or monitoring suggests that the focus and purpose of the 
Jimmy Ryce Act is to detain criminals, rather than reform or monitor 
them.149 
Yet another indicator is the lack of less restrictive alternatives.150 
In Hendricks, Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissenting opinion 
that the Court has often held that “a failure to consider, or to use, 
                                                                                                             
 143 See id. at 361. 
 144 See id. 
 145 See Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Pred-
ators’ Treatment and Care Act (“Jimmy Ryce Act”) of 1998, ch. 98-64, § 24, 1998 
Fla. Laws 445–455 (codified as FLA. STAT. §§ 394.910–394.932 (2016)). 
 146 See Hendricks, 512 U.S. at 361. 
 147 See Presley, supra note 14, at 499–500. 
 148 See id. 
 149 See id. at 500. 
 150 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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alternative and less harsh methods to achieve a nonpunitive objec-
tive can help show that legislature’s purpose. . . was to punish.”151 
The Jimmy Ryce Act does not account for less restrictive means to 
“protect the public” and imposes “significantly greater restriction of 
an individual’s liberty than public safety requires.”152 
During the Florida Supreme Court’s review of the Jimmy Ryce 
Act, the civil detainee, Westerheide, raised several points to demon-
strate that commitment was not civil in nature: 
[The] treatment is delayed until after an individual’s 
criminal sentence has been served; there is no effec-
tive treatment available for sexually violent offend-
ers; the scheme creates barriers to effective treatment 
by removing the confidentiality of the patient-psy-
chotherapist relationship and [by] not providing for 
community aftercare; and the scheme fails to provide 
for a less restrictive alternative to total confinement 
in a secure facility.153 
In response, the Florida Supreme Court examined each of those 
contentions and concluded that they did not disprove the State’s de-
clared intent to create a civil commitment program. 154 
B. Unintended Indications that the Jimmy Ryce Act Functions as 
Punitive Confinement 
In addition to the constructive examples contradicting the legis-
lature’s purported intent to create civil conferment procedures, since 
the Act’s enactment, challenges to implementation have also indi-
cated that the SVP statute acts punitively. For example, “[t]he lack 
of funding for the Jimmy Ryce Act further undermines the notion 
                                                                                                             
 151 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Westerheide, 831 So. 2d at 100–101. 
 154 See id. at 101–104. 
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that Florida will use this program as a genuine attempt at treat-
ment.”155 The Florida Department of Children and Family Ser-
vices—the Department charged with implementing the Act156—es-
timated the program to top $60.6 million in the first year.157 How-
ever, the legislature allocated less than $4 million towards the pro-
gram.158 Nearly ten years after the passage of the Act, the funding 
issue persisted.159 In an alarming review of the Act, David M. Reut-
ter, a prisoner himself, disputed the purported rehabilitative purpose 
and claimed that “not one resident has completed the treatment reg-
imen, but over 200 formerly-incarcerated sex offenders have been 
released from” the treatment center.160 
Reutter is not alone in pointing to a lack of funding as evidence 
that the Act is not designed to provide treatment.161 Justice Pariente 
of the Florida Supreme Court supports Reutter’s position, noting 
that “the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) houses 
detained and committed residents in what has been termed a $62–
million, ‘state-of-the-art facility’ that opened in April 2009.”162 The 
sexual offender treatment program—considered “one of the corner-
stones of the Act”—was the subject of a class action lawsuit in fed-
eral court due to concerns of its adequacy.163 
                                                                                                             
 155 Presley, supra note 14, at 496. 
 156 See FLA. STAT. § 394.457(1) (2016) (stating that the “Department of Chil-
dren and Family Services is designated the ‘Mental Health Authority’ of Flor-
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 157 See Presley, supra note 14, at 496. 
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 159 See David M. Reutter, Florida’s Civil Commitment Center Under Funded 
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 161 See, e.g., Morel v. Wilkins, 84 So. 3d 226, 248 (Fla. 2012) (Pariente, J., 
concurring). 
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 163 Id. Prior to the opening of the FCCC facility in 2009, Michelle Barki of the 
Fourth Circuit Public Defender’s Office in Jacksonville “point[ed] to a February 
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guishing Jimmy Ryce Cases, FLA. BAR: FLA. BAR NEWS (Apr. 1, 2012), 
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As of February 2011, only 386 of the 663 residents at the FCCC 
“were committed and consenting to treatment.”164 And, “[s]ince the 
inception of the Act, 700 individuals have been released from deten-
tion.”165 Only “thirty-two residents [had] actually completed all four 
phases of the sexual offender treatment program, and of those thirty-
two, only eighteen [had] received a letter of maximum therapeutic 
benefit.”166 This further undermines the purported palliative goals 
of confinement. 
The vast majority of Jimmy Ryce respondents were not released 
as a result of their successful completion of “the four-phase treat-
ment regimen, but by prevailing at trial, obtaining a court-ordered 
release with stipulated conditions, receiving a trial court determina-
tion that they no longer meet the criteria of being a sexually violent 
predator, or returning to prison.”167 These statistics suggest that the 
Jimmy Ryce Act may not be serving its intended purpose because 
sex offenders are being released without any meaningful interven-
tion or rehabilitation.168 
C. Further Problems with the Jimmy Ryce Act Beyond Whether it 
is Punitive 
Although the Hendricks Court dismissed Hendricks’s argument 
that “mental abnormality” was not a proper medical term,169 con-
cerns remain that its usage effectively creates “a controversial 
branch of mental illness that ostensibly justifies involuntary civil 
commitment.”170 If the definition of mental abnormality means that 
“a sexually violent predator lacks volitional control over his or her 
actions,” the issue of competence invariably arises, as well as the 
propriety of criminal punishment to begin with.171 In other words, 
these offenders were not competent to stand trial in the first instance; 
civil commitment would have been appropriate after the mentally 
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 164 Morel, 84 So.3d at 248. 
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 167 Id. at 248–49. 
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 169 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358–60. 
 170 Presley, supra note 14, at 500. 
 171 Id. at 500–501. 
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abnormal individual—that cannot control him or herself—first com-
mitted an act of sexual violence out of his or her control.172 
 Along the same vein, the term “mental abnormality” is prob-
lematic because applying law based on a term that lacks a precise 
and consistent meaning will result in an imprecise and inconsistent 
application of the law.173 Mental abnormality is a requisite to civil 
commitment, but the legislature and advocates for civil confinement 
eschew the possibility that the detainees are mentally ill.174 Even 
Jimmy Ryce’s mother said in regard to SVP: “These people are not 
insane.”175 
The use of mental abnormality creates at least two important 
problems. First, as mentioned above, if the SVP is mentally ill, they 
should be committed, not imprisoned.176 Second, if the definition of 
“mental abnormality” is open to variability,177 what are the safe-
guards against any number of behaviors being deemed a “mental 
abnormality” and a permissible basis for civil confinement?178 A 
possible consequence of “employing commitment in lieu of criminal 
prosecution and labeling behavior insane rather than criminal,” is 
that the state could “circumvent the system of constitutional protec-
tions afforded to persons accused of crimes.”179 By permitting SVP 
statutes to be deemed “civil” rather than “punitive,” we risk “the 
precise abuse of power Article I is designed to prevent—the use of 
                                                                                                             
 172 See id. at 500–501 (“[I]f these legislatures truly endorse the controversial 
perspective that persons who commit sexually violent crimes suffer from a mental 
illness, and that condition makes them a danger to society, then it should not as-
sess criminal culpability.”). 
 173 See Prescott, supra note 21, at 848. 
 174 See Presley, supra note 14, at 488–89. See also Prescott, supra note 21, at 
848 (“Abnormal behavior, such as criminal acts of sexual violence, do not indicate 
a ‘mental illness’ unless the individual’s thoughts are distorted by mental dis-
ease.”). 
 175 Presley, supra note 14, at 489 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 176 See 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a). 
 177 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359. 
 178 See Presley, supra note 14, at 489 (“[A]ny number of behavioral patterns 
are unusual; thus, any number of behavioral patterns could be labeled ‘insane’ by 
the state under legislation similar to the Jimmy Ryce Act.”). 
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a limited grant of authority as a ‘pretext. . . for the accomplishment 
of objects not intrusted [sic] to the government.”180 
In addition to concerns regarding whether the Jimmy Ryce Act 
is punitive rather than civil, and whether it permits an encroachment 
of government control over individuals deemed to have a “mental 
abnormality,” since the Act’s enactment, commentators and critics 
have pointed to numerous other issues implicating the Act’s consti-
tutionality.181 One such example is found in Westerheide.182 Justice 
Quince concurred in result only and wrote an opinion pointing out 
the lack of adversarial probable cause hearings.183 The Act permits 
“ex parte determinations of whether probable cause exists to believe 
that the defendants are sexual predators and thus eligible for contin-
ued confinements after the expiration of their sentences.”184 This in-
cludes preliminary detainment after the defendant’s sentence has 
been served but they have not yet been tried under the Act.185 De-
fendants and their attorneys are not allowed to be present at the ini-
tial probable cause determination—but if the trial judge has found 
probable cause, then “the trial judge will order that the defendants 
remain in custody and then be immediately transferred to a secure 
facility, if their sentences have already expired.”186 
CONCLUSION 
SVP statutes confront the legal system with a seemingly irrec-
oncilable dissonance. On the one hand, the goal of preventing the 
commission of horrific crimes is indisputably invaluable. But on the 
other hand,”[t]here is no question that SVP civil commitment con-
stitutes a complete loss of liberty, and the statistics regarding SVPs 
eventually released into society make clear the possibility of lifelong 
commitment is very real.”187  That loss of liberty constitutes a basis 
                                                                                                             
 180 Comstock, 560 U.S. at 180 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing McCulloch, 17 
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for concern and contemplation because our government, for an un-
deniably good intention, has increased its power to incarcerate indi-
viduals, carved out an exception to a limit on its power, and as a 
result, has infringed on individuals’ fundamental right to liberty and 
due process. While weighing these competing interests, our judicial 
system has—perhaps reasonably—erred on the side of protecting 
children, but it remains that our judicial system has erred. 
No one denies the importance of protecting children from hor-
rific abuse and violence, but how “can we be sure . . . that the legis-
lature will continue to view only sexual offenders as a special and 
unique class of criminals?”188 For example, civil commitment could 
easily present itself as a solution to the crimes of other habitual of-
fenders, such as those who commit domestic violence or suffer from 
addiction to alcohol or drugs.  Justice Pariente in her Westerheide 
dissent implored, “[f]or the sake of our democracy and the freedom 
that has been the hallmark of our society, let us hope that is not 
where we are headed.”189 
Practical considerations—for example, the lack of treatment or 
monitoring options—may tie the hands of judges and give them no 
meaningful option other than civil detention.  Rehabilitative services 
cost money, and the judiciary does not control funding for such pro-
grams.  Therefore, this issue requires alternative solutions. 
Perhaps the solution to stopping sexually violent predators like 
Danny Heinrich and John Couey lies in a wider reformation of the 
criminal justice system. The need for the allocation of additional re-
sources, especially funding of treatment and rehabilitative pro-
grams, is glaring.  In addition, comprehensive monitoring—i.e., an-
kle bracelets, probation officers, check-ins, and restricted mobil-
ity—may serve as less restrictive alternatives to the constitutionally 
questionable practice of state-administrated indefinite detention. 
Justice Quince argues that if society’s “true goal is to change the 
behavior of the defendants so that they can be safely returned to our 
                                                                                                             
 188 In re Leon G., 26 P.3d 481, 491 (Ariz. 2001) (Feldman, J., concurring), 
vacated sub nom. Glick v. Arizona, 535 U.S. 982 (2002) (“If prosecutors are able 
to find mental health professionals willing to testify that people who commit re-
petitive assaults of a non-sexual nature have a mental abnormality predisposing 
them to such violent behavior, will the legislature pass the laws to keep them in-
carcerated beyond their criminal sentences by the device of civil commitment?”). 
 189 Westerheide, 831 So. 2d at 120 (Pariente, J., dissenting in part). 
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communities then we should begin this process in a more timely 
fashion.”190 
In the alternative, harsher sentencing that avoids the prospect of 
releasing sex offenders into the public is another consideration. As 
Justice Kennedy suggested, the appropriate sentences for criminals 
who commit sexual violence against children may possibly be a life 
sentence.191 
More sophisticated legal reasoning is yet another option. As it 
stands, the Supreme Court’s justification for condoning sexual pred-
ator civil commitment laws—that those laws are civil in nature, not 
criminal—is not persuasive legal reasoning. As a result, regardless 
of the understandable motivation, criticism of the judiciary’s allow-
ance of these statutory schemes is valid. 
In the 2002 film adaption of Minority Report, Tom Cruise plays 
a police detective who stops crimes before they occur by relying on 
the visions of three psychics who see into the future.192  The psychics 
eventually predict that Cruise will commit a murder, setting him off 
on a journey to vindicate himself before the authorities incarcerate 
him.  Ultimately, Cruise reveals a flaw in the system; namely, that 
once a person is forewarned of their crime, they are free to choose 
not to commit it. 
In Hollywood, potential criminal actors are morally sound and 
make the right decisions. In the real world, potential criminal actors 
cannot be trusted to exercise sound moral judgment and make good 
decisions.  However, our constitution limits the power of the state to 
deprive individuals of liberty without due process.  Once the erosion 
of a fundamental boundary is accepted, it is difficult and unlikely 
that the state will ever cede that power back to the people.  Accord-
ingly, it is imperative to closely analyze and contemplate the solu-
tion we have devised for dealing with sexually violent predators. 
 
                                                                                                             
 190 Id. at 113 (Quince, J., concurring). 
 191 Cf. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“With [Hen-
dricks’s] criminal record, after all, a life term may well have been the only sen-
tence appropriate to protect society and vindicate the wrong.”). 
  192    MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox and Dreamworks Pictures 
2002). 
